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OSMAN MOHAMED OSMAN ALI
CONFLICT WITH OTHERS  
AT A BLEEDING FRONTIER
THE CASE OF TAGOI IN THE NORTHEASTERN  
NUBA MOUNTAINS – SUDAN
ABSTRACT
This article looks at the escalating conlict between the Tagoi and Hawazma and their allies over natural resources and political authority in the 
north-eastern Nuba Mountains, from the Tagoi’s perspective. It explains why 
and how the Tagoi Area has become a free zone for settlement by the 
Hawazma and their allies, who have succeeded in developing an independ-
ent native administration in the area and have begun to contest the Tagoi’s 
rights to political authority and land. It illustrates how security concerns asso-
ciated with the Second Civil War between the government of Sudan (GoS) 
and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) irst and the 
Sudan/South Sudan international border after the secession of South Sudan in 
2011 have contributed to the escalation of this conlict. It also shows how this 
conlict has recently become entangled with the armed conlict between the 
GoS and the SPLM/A-North, thus attaining a new dimension.
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The subject of this article is the Tagoi tribe 1, who have not received a great 
deal of attention from social scientists. It deals with the disputes over natural 
resources and political authority between the Tagoi, who claim prior access to 
the north-eastern Nuba Mountains, 2 and the Hawazma Baggara (or simply the 
Hawazma) and their allies, 3 who have arrived in the region recently in 
response to a variety of interests and attractions. 4 It studies the arguments 
from the Tagoi’s perspective.
The article is based on material collected during ieldwork carried out 
from November 2012 to March 2015 among Tagoi migrants in Khartoum 
State. The concentration of ieldwork in Khartoum State was due to security 
threats in the Tagoi Area and the recent presence of the largest group of Tagoi 
migrants in Khartoum, mostly on the outskirts of the three towns. Only one 
short ield trip to the Tagoi Area, which focused on corrective and additional 
data, was organized in March 2015 as a inale to the ieldwork. This trip only 
became possible when an opportunity arose to visit the Tagoi Area to offer 
condolences for the death of the tribe’s king, Mek Mohamed Ahmed Hamdan 
Jabouri, which presented an opportunity for large numbers of Tagoi mourners 
to visit their home region, from which they had led in 2011 because of an 
surge in the conlict between the government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement/Army North (SPLM/A-N) in areas of South 
Kordofan, including the Tagoi Area. The majority of Tagoi families were forci-
bly displaced to safer areas in Sudan, and the Tagoi villages were totally 
stripped of their populations. Only the families of the royal kin group 
(khashum albeit) are currently in Alfaydh, the capital of the Tagoi Kingdom, as 
1. Although currently contested in African studies, the term “tribe” is used in this 
article because all the Tagoi informants speak of their own and their neighbouring 
groups as “tribes”. Many people from neighbouring groups (such as the Kajagjah, 
Rashad, Tegali, Tira, and Kawalib) also identify the Tagoi as a “tribal group”. It is there-
fore practical to use this term.
2. According to an oral tradition, the Tagoi migrated from the Arabian Peninsula to 
Abyssinia, from Abyssinia to the Funj Kingdom, and then from the Funj Kingdom to 
the North-Eastern Nuba Mountains. They arrived there in the second quarter of the 
18th century, at the beginning of the reign of their irst king, Mek Kundan (1726-
1751). This chronological calculation is what the Tagoi depend on for proving the 
precedence of their existence in the area of the Mount of Tagoi and its surrounding 
plains. Hawazma settlement in the Tagoi Area began in the 1940s and 1950s during 
the reign of Mek Hamdan Jabouri (1933-1968). In short, the Tagoi claim their status 
as “irst comers” to the area, and are thus autochthonic there.
3. These include Jallaba merchants and some groups from West Africa: Barno, Bargo 
and Fallāta (locally known as “BBF”).
4. These interests and attractions involved grasslands, extensive fertile lands that are 
suitable for growing important cash crops, and opportunities for successful trading.
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Tagoi customary law prevents them from leaving Tagoi land under any cir-
cumstances, even if they risk extermination.
The ieldwork included group interviews with men and women. Data were 
also collected through face-to-face individual interviews and telephone con-
versations with Tagoi with a profound knowledge of the history and culture of 
their tribe. Unplanned brief conversations with males and females of various 
ages were also conducted during occasions for celebration and mourning in 
Tagoi households in Khartoum and Alfaydh.
All the group interviews were conducted in Khartoum State, with the 
exception of one, which took place in Alfaydh. Between three and eight Tagoi 
from the elite and the ordinary population participated in each of twenty-six 
group interviews. The criteria for the selection of participants were the acqui-
sition of in-depth knowledge and new information on issues for discussion. 
The participants were between 50 and 85 years of age. Two attended all the 
group interviews, as they were the link between the author and the Tagoi peo-
ple and were the organizers of the group and individual interviews. Most of 
the participants were male; women were only present at one group interview, 
but it lasted for six consecutive hours, concentrating on important issues relat-
ing to women. The participants were both members of the royal kin-group and 
commoners, including native administrators, casual workers, housewives, 
businessmen, soldiers, police, school teachers, government employees, work-
ers and medical staff. Pensioners formed the majority of these participants.
To illustrate how the Tagoi’s oral history, which is briely mentioned at var-
ious stages of this article, makes sense within the wider regional context (that 
is, the north-eastern Nuba Mountains, the “Kingdom of Tegali” and other 
areas of Sudan), brief relevant historical sources were reviewed; they will be 
cited later in this article. Other secondary data were obtained by reviewing 
previous studies in the context of violent conlicts in Southern Kordofan, and 
a variety of extra secondary data has also been used in certain sections.
The article seeks to answer two principal questions stemming from the 
preliminary observations: (1) how did the mostly simple and locally managea-
ble farmer-herder disputes about natural resources in the Tagoi Area escalate 
and then coalesce into the armed conlict between the GoS and the armed 
rebel movements in South Kordofan? (2) what is behind the armed interven-
tion by the government in favour of the Arab nomadic pastoralists in their 
conlict with the Tagoi over land and authority?
THE TAGOI: AN HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Over the course of history, a large number of tribes have found refuge in the 
granite hills of the Nuba Mountains, which cover an area of 30,000 square 
miles, and whose boulders rise above the plain of Kordofan (Elles 1935: 4). We 
are therefore presented with a substantial variety of cultures over the small area 
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in which the Tagoi live. The irregular rectangular-shaped Tagoi area (“Tatgoi”, in 
the Tagoi language) is located in the north-eastern Nuba Mountains and 
stretches from north to south, angled in a slightly north-westerly direction (see 
map no. 1, below). According to a recent government-imposed boundary 
demarcation in South Kordofan State, the Tagoi Area is part of the Abu Kershola 
Locality, 5 and is surrounded by the localities of Al-Rahad, Um Rawabah, 
Al-Abbasiyya, Rashad, Haiban, Dellami, and Habila. A number of tribal groups 
also surround the Tagoi: Nuba of the Mount of Daeir, Kajagjah, Tukom, 6 
Rashad, Tegali, Lunfan, Kawahla, Tira, Heiban Uttor, Kortala, Kawalib, and the 
inhabitants of the “Six Mounts”.
The Modern History of the Tagoi
Prior to the 16th century, many Nuba peoples were spread over what is 
today northern, central, and western Kordofan. The arrival in the 16th century 
5. Source: warrant of establishment of Abu Kershola Locality, South Kordofān State, 
2014.
6. One should not confuse “Tukom” with “Tagum”. The irst is a subgroup of the 
Tagoi tribe, while the other is a subgroup of the Rashad tribe. Both live in the 
north-eastern Nuba Mountains.
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of the Muslim Juhaina, who later formed the pastoral seasonal migrant tribes 
(such as the Baggara) in northern Kordofan and later on the Muslim Ja‘aliyyin 
and Ghudiyyat (of largely indigenous origin) in central Kordofan, and who 
also organized slave-raids and engaged in inter-tribal warfare, played their 
part in conining the Nuba to South Kordofan (Stevenson, 1962: 118-119; 
Stevenson 1963: 9). In South Kordofan, some Nuba occupied uninhabited 
hills, while others drove out weaker communities from their homes and occu-
pied them themselves. There followed a time of plenty for the Nuba in South 
Kordofan. Vast tracts of land surrounding the hills were cultivated, so that 
when the Baggara arrived in Kordofan in search of pasture and water, they 
naturally turned southwards into this prosperous region at some time during 
the 18th century, drove the Nuba into the hills, and occupied all the best 
watering places. Sub-divisions were then put into place, with each sub-tribe 
of the Baggara taking its own area of hills and watering places. Each of these 
sub-tribes usually protected the hills in its own area in return for supplies of 
grain and slaves, and raided hills belonging to other sub-tribes. Much the 
same state of affairs persisted during the Turco-Egyptian occupation of the 
country in the 19th century. A few hills were attacked, and their populations 
wiped out, some sub-tribes paid tributes in the form of recruits for the army, 
and the remainder were left to the Baggara, who in return paid heavy tributes 
and provided the army with recruits who had been taken from the Nuba by 
force (Sagar 1925: 138-140).
The irst parts of the Nuba Mountains to be inluenced by Islam through 
Islamic preachers were the hills in the north-east (Tegali, Tagoi, Rashad, etc.), 
which was perhaps the most easily accessible area (Stevenson 1963: 10-11). 
One of these preachers, Mohammed Al-Jaʻali, came to Tegali from the north in 
about 1530. Kabr-Kabr, the chieftain of Tegali, gave him his daughter in mar-
riage, and she bore him a son (Abu Jaridah). Kabr-Kabr died in due course, and 
Abu Jaridah was chosen as his successor. The kingdom to which he succeeded 
consisted of no more than a few hills in Tegali. It was he who irst conceived the 
idea of facilitating the spread of Islam and extending his own power by bring-
ing in settlers from the north and east. His descendants continued to spread 
Islam and expand the kingdom, and by the middle of the 17th century they 
ruled supreme over all the north-eastern Nuba Mountains. As rulers of an inde-
pendent state who were on friendly terms with the powerful kings of Sinnar, 
they installed migrants from the Funj as subject kings (Meks) over the hills of 
Rashad, Tagoi, and Gadir, and in later years, both Rashad and Tagoi were 
allowed to become independent kingdoms. This was the Kingdom of Tegali 
before the coming of the Arab nomadic tribes, who began to arrive towards the 
end of the reign of Ismaʻil Mohammed Jeelyh Abu Gurun, the eighth king of 
Tegali (1705-1773), and continued to iniltrate the area until the 19th century. 
They all became subject to the kings of Tegali (Elles 1935: 4-10, 19).
During the Mahadiyya, the Khalifa Abdullahi Al-Taʻaishi in 1885 dis-
patched a force to punish the Nuba Mountains for the increasing insurgences 
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there. Hamdan Abu Anja in the west, and El-Nur Angara in the east, reduced 
the old kingdom of Tegali to a state of ruin and desolation. Eventually, towards 
the end of 1887, the two Emirs returned to Omdurman, taking with them the 
majority of those who had not been killed. Once again, Ibrahim El-Khalil, a 
young leader of the Mahadiyya army, who raided the Nuba Mountains in 
about 1892, inlicted severe punishment on Tegali, contenting himself with 
sacking the Tagoi and Kajagjah hills. Jeelyh Adam Dabello (1892-1916), who 
was king of Tegali when Kordofan was reoccupied, soon acknowledged the 
government of the new Anglo-Egyptian regime and remained loyal by force of 
circumstances. In 1899, a Mamur was posted to Keraia, 7 but it was not until 
some years later that a British Inspector was also posted (Elles 1935: 25-26, 
28-29). The new administrators saw that the only possible method of con-
trolling the “broken fragments” of the old kingdom of Tegali, which consisted 
of diverse, largely autonomous, units in an area stretching from north to south 
(230 miles) with very poor communications, was to proceed slowly and allow 
the broken fragments to grow together, assisted by two main inluences: com-
mon economic interests and the old traditions of the Tegali crown. The 
essential prerequisite – that all these fragments should be within a single 
administrative district – was satisied in 1931, when Talodi was added to the 
Eastern Jebels District. Thereafter, common district headquarters and judicial 
and taxation systems, frequent meetings of the heads of the various divisions, 
and the opportunity for Mek Adam, the son of Jeelyh Adam Dabello, to visit 
even the most southerly of the areas that once owed allegiance to his for-
bears, all worked towards the same end: to bind the various parts into a 
greater whole without making them feel that they were losing their local or 
tribal identities. The expansion of the Tegali Kingdom then began, and 
Kawahla, Kenana, Hawazma Halafa, Moreib, Tukom, Turjok, Tagoi, Rashad, 
Nuba of Kau-Nyaro hills, Elliri, Aulad Himeid and Talodi Omodia were gradu-
ally added over a period of twenty-four years, after which time the kingdom 
of Tegali covered almost the whole of the Eastern Jebels District and com-
prised some 140,000 people within an area of around 15,000 square miles. 
No sooner had the government completed its policy of piecing together the 
broken fragments of the old kingdom and restoring the authority of its heredi-
tary ruler than it transformed it into a warranted rural district council in 1947. 
This change was brought about with the minimum amount of dislocation. In 
this way, the old kingdom of Tegali, which had been founded in the 16th cen-
tury, reached its apex in the 19th century, and was disturbed by the Mahdiyya 
and rebuilt by the Anglo-Egyptian government in the 20th century, ceased to 
exist after that time. It is not dead, however: rather, it has undergone a natural 
transformation in line with modern trends in Sudan (Kenrick 1948: 144-150).
7. Keraia was the capital of Tegali Kingdom until it was moved to Abbasiyya in 1929, 
during the Anglo-Egyptian rule.
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The main turning points in the history of the Tagoi, which is chiely based 
on traditional tales recounted by Tagoi informants 8 and embedded in the main 
historical changes described above, are these: a small Arabic-speaking group 
of Muslim Funj was exiled from Sinnar, the capital of the Funj Kingdom, to the 
north-eastern Nuba Mountains following a dispute over political authority. 
This movement had taken shape during the reign of the irst Tagoi king “Mek 
Kundan” (1726-1751), during a period that saw major political changes in the 
Funj Kingdom that explain why and how the Tagoi, as a Funj group, were 
exiled from Sinnar: between 1650 and 1750, the king of the Muslim Nubians 
reigned over lands from Dongola to Ethiopia and from the Red Sea into 
Kordofan, and exacted tributes from the neighbouring southern lands of 
Kordofan and Fazughli and from the Shilluk. Their kingdom was known both 
by the name of its capital, Sinnar, and as Funj Kingdom, after the name of its 
ruling group, the Funj (or Unsab), who were recognized as Arabs (Spaulding 
1985: 3, 96, 212). The Unsab dynasty was overthrown in a coup that took 
place in about 1718. The reigning sultan was replaced by his maternal uncle, 
Nol. After a brief reign, Nol’s son, Badi IV, succeeded him, and their com-
bined reigns (1718-1762) constituted the opening phase of what the historian 
Jay Spaulding has called the Heroic Age of Sinnar. The Funj then suffered 
repression, and Badi IV made a bold bid for the support of other elements in 
society (Spaulding 1985: 212-223, 284-286).
Intermarriages between the expatriate and host groups in the north-east-
ern Nuba Mountains resulted in a socio-cultural cross-fertilization, giving the 
Tagoi their distinctive culture and an acquired language with a local class-pre-
ix and concord system and considerable Arabic inluences (Stevenson 1962: 
122-125). The expatriates founded a kingdom and became holders of politi-
cal authority. In line with the quotation from Elles (1935: 19) above, the kings 
of Tegali, who were on friendly terms with the powerful kings of Sinnar, 
installed Funj migrants as subject kings over the Tagoi and other hills. The 
Tagoi thus began to have direct contact with the Islamic world, and their lives 
started to undergo a number of changes during the reign of Mek Jabouri I 
(1828-1851) in the form of serious conversions to Islam and the Arabicization 
of the names of people and villages. Religious authority was acquired by the 
political rulers during the reign of Mek Jabouri II (1888-1896), when the 
8. The historical accounts that follow are based on a version of oral history that is 
common among the Tagoi and is narrated by informants of different ages and from 
different social strata. No other versions of this history were touched on during the 
prolonged ieldwork. Hardly any documents were available to cast light on the history 
of the Tagoi: the documents that related these historical accounts were burnt in 1942 
in a lightning strike on the home of Mek Hamdan Jabouri Jeely (1933-1968), the father 
of the late Mek Mohamed Ahmed (1968-2015), the former kings of Tagoi (mentioned 
by Mek Mohamed Ahmed Hamdan in a group interview, Khartoum, 24/11/2012).
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orientation towards Islam irst became prevalent among the Tagoi. After that 
time, the kings of Tagoi became both political leaders and men of religion, 
and the numbers of Qur’anic schools, mosques, and scholars of Fiqh and 
Islamic Shariʻa grew rapidly and Sui missionary work accelerated a change 
in people’s perceptions, the disappearance of many local religious beliefs 
and practices, and the emergence of a new understanding of religion.
The Tagoi in the 20th Century
Between the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium period (1899-1956) and the 
present day, the Tagoi in the Nuba Mountains have undergone signiicant 
socioeconomic and political transformations: with the establishment of a 
strong administrative system in the Nuba Mountains during the Condominium, 
inter-tribal wars were brought under control, cultivation was extended out-
wards from around the foothills, and Nuba farmers began to rebuild their 
homesteads on the lower slopes and pediments fringing the massifs in areas 
exposed to government and commercial inluences. This down-migration 
started in the early 1930s (Roden 1972: 79-80), and the Tagoi, too, descended 
from their mountains on the orders of their king, Mek Hamdan Jabouri (1933-
1968) and occupied a number of permanent villages situated several miles on 
to the plains. The reasons for this descent included over-crowding, waves of 
epidemic diseases, the need for the newly-emerging modern social facilities 
(such as schools, hospitals, and markets), their desire to take advantage of bet-
ter natural resources and protect their lands from settlement by outside groups, 
the introduction of rain-fed short staple cotton farming on the plains, and the 
construction of a cotton gin in Um Berimbeta in 1936. 9 Since that time, the 
Tagoi have lived rather different lives, and have opened up to neighbouring 
tribal groups and wider Sudanese society.
As I will show in a later section of this article, there have recently been 
mass migrations from the Tagoi Area, as a consequence of which many vil-
lages there have been depopulated. The Tagoi have also suffered from a loss of 
access to many cultivable and grazing lands as a consequence of outright 
land-grabbing resulting from expanding agricultural schemes and direct inter-
ventions by the government or government-supported armed pastoralists. As 
they became one of the populations that inhabited a “hard border” with the 
newly-established South Sudan, while also remaining socially and culturally 
on the margins as before, the Tagoi have also been involved in the ongoing 
civil war since 2011, many of them ighting alongside the SPLM/A-N. They 
have been seriously affected by the counter-insurgency operations led by the 
government in the region, and have become almost an internal diaspora pop-
ulation, spread across various parts of Sudan.
9. Source: the foundation stone of the cotton gin in Um Berimbeta.
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Leif Manger sees the current violent conlicts in Southern Kordofan as fall-
ing within a tradition of enmities, unrest, and violence throughout the region’s 
history that is a result of the struggle for sovereignty over land and the right of 
self-determination of their development. Manger traces the historical legacies 
of these conlicts back to pre-war colonial times, and argues that since that 
time, questions of land rights and use have been framed in ethnic, religious, 
and racial terms, with the Nuba’s past as an enslavable population being per-
ceived as the basis for their relations with other groups (Manger 2007, 2001).
Some studies have analysed how historical, social, and political dynamics 
have systematically marginalized the Nuba and deprived them of their cus-
tomary lands. The Nuba were ignored during the peace negotiations between 
the GoS and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), 10 even 
though they were in a similar position of socioeconomic and political margin-
alization to the southern Sudanese. They are marginalized in the political and 
economic spheres in different ways, as they have also suffered a long history 
of oppression, and so the recent conlicts might also be a result of Nuba resist-
ance to any further repression. These studies also explore how the Nuba 
Mountains have emerged as a borderland with geopolitical signiicance in the 
wake of South Sudan’s separation. This situation is associated with violent 
conlicts and contested boundaries, not only between Sudan and South Sudan, 
but also among several groups with economic and other interests in the area 
(Komey 2013, 2008; Abbas 1973; Mohamed Salih 1995; Kadouf 2001).
As other studies have shown, denial of access to natural resources is also a 
key factor in the violence between the sedentary Nuba and the pastoralist 
Baggara groups in Southern Kordofan. While coexistence between the Baggara 
and Nuba is an important cultural feature, it was also shaped by competition 
over fertile land, water sources, and forest products, but the different modes of 
cooperation and conlict changed signiicantly during the civil war, and many 
forms of coexistence ceased to exist when one group lost its land rights 
entirely. To this one must add the natural resource-based conlicts between 
farmers and nomadic pastoralists in the Nuba Mountains, which intensiied 
after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the GoS and the SPLM/A 
10. These are the negotiations between the GoS and the SPLM/A that began in June 
2002 to end the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005), to develop democratic 
governance countrywide, and to share oil revenues. They culminated in the January 
9, 2005 signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), also known as the 
Naivasha Agreement. The CPA was a collection of agreements that the GoS and the 
SPLM/A signed between 2002 and 2005. Included in the CPA are updates and 
amendments to previous protocols. It further sets a timetable for a referendum in 
Southern Sudan on its independence. The peace process was encouraged by the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as well as by IGAD-Partners, a 
consortium of donor countries.
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in 2005, because they were no longer manageable using traditional conlict 
resolution patterns (Adam 2009; Suliman 1998; Komey 2008).
Intervention by the State, which often favours one side and excludes the 
other from land use, is one of the factors that escalated the conlicts in 
Southern Kordofan into nationwide civil wars. The revival of tribal militias 
there started at the beginning of the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-
2005). 11 The government backed militias among the Baggara and incorporated 
them into the State’s institutions of violence. As a result of this, the Nuba 
people experienced extreme violence, as the government supported the 
Baggara groups in their claims over Nuba land and other resources by arming 
these groups against them (Mohamed Salih 1995, 1994), and the relations 
between the Nuba and Baggara changed from an uneasy peace to irremedia-
ble enmity (Suliman 1999).
Some studies argue that the concepts of identity and belonging have been 
driving forces of conlicts in Southern Kordofan. They focus on claims of an 
autochthonous identity among the Nuba, and explore the myths surrounding 
their origins, their relationship to the area, and the political implications in 
the context of socio-political processes in the region. Claims over communal 
land on the grounds of autochthony become a source of identity politics, and 
the way the Nuba constructed these policies and how the neighbouring 
Baggara responded to these claims in the context and aftermath of the civil 
war are explained. The Nuba’s land claims, which were backed up with eth-
nic, cultural, and religious explanations that were closely connected to the 
concept of the Nuba Mountains as their ancestral homeland, have been chal-
lenged by the Baggara and the modern Sudanese state, and this has led to a 
conlict between legality according to the State and the legitimacy of the tra-
ditional institutions (Komey 2009, 2008; Manger 2007; Suliman 2002).
 A Basic Perspective
The Tagoi people generally draw their social life and social relations per-
spectives from their tribe’s political and administrative hierarchy, in the past 
from the king down to his advisors and then his subjects, and nowadays from 
the Amir down to the Omdas and Sheikhs and then his subjects. They used 
this pyramid of authority formally to depict how their homes were located on 
the Mount of Tagoi, where the homes of the king and his married children 
were at the top of the mountain, the homes of the king’s advisers directly 
below, and the commoners’ homes at the bottom of the mountain. This depic-
tion extends to the conical roof of the hut: Tagoi informants perceive its 
11. The Second Sudanese Civil War was largely a continuation of the First Sudanese Civil 
War, which was a conlict between the northern part of Sudan and the southern Sudan 
region from 1955 to 1972 that demanded representation and more regional autonomy.
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structure as being similar to the pyramid of authority and the style of their 
houses on the Mount of Tagoi. Typically, the roof of a hut consists of four main 
large wooden posts that are installed vertically and then tied together with 
three main round ties of thin horizontal wooden posts that bear the names of 
the social strata in the politico-administrative hierarchy: the king (jittar), the 
king’s advisors (jindi), and the general public (yidro).
During the reign of Mek Adam Jabouri (1910-1933), the Tagoi native 
administration attempted to build the Tagoi kingdom across its wider geo-
graphical area using the same perspective for building huts or homes, both of 
which have the same name in the Tagoi language (kon). They demarcated its 
borders with neighbouring tribes and then installed Tagoi families from the 
various social strata along these borders to secure property rights and control 
entry by non-Tagoi. Mek Adam Jabouri then announced the borders of Tagoi 
Area and that they were owned by his tribe, and issued a decree imposing 
fees on non-Tagoi persons who crossed through or resided in this area. This 
action became necessary when the Tagoi began to descend from the Mount of 
Tagoi and spread out in villages on the plains below. 12
In the run-up to the reign of Mek Adam Jabouri, no regional government 
had authority over the Tagoi area. It was only after the execution of Mek 
Gedayl Jabouri 13 that the Anglo-Egyptian colonial authorities established their 
tutelage in the area, which has been part of the State of Sudan since that time. 
It was therefore essential for Mek Adam Jabouri to demarcate the borders of 
the Tagoi kingdom. The main reason behind this demarcation was to reserve 
the land and its natural resources. Some Tagoi informants claim that when 
their grandparents irst left their mountain, the surrounding latlands were 
completely devoid of people, as they were also part of the Tagoi territory. For 
them, the areas within this territory are currently either inhabited by the Tagoi 
alone or shared between the Tagoi and the other recently arrived groups 
(Hawazma, Barno, Bargo, Fallata, Bedeiriyya, and Masalit).
The building of the wider kingdom structure was not complete following 
the border demarcation, however. For the Tagoi informants, the main bonds 
representing the different social strata were not strengthened as a hut is tradi-
tionally built, and did not connect all the parts and levels of the kingdom. 
12. As mentioned previously, the documents that related this information were burnt 
in 1942 at the home of Mek Hamdan Jabouri Jeelyh.
13. Mek Gedayl led an active Tagoi rebellion against the new Anglo-Egyptian colonial 
rule in the north-eastern Nuba Mountains until he was captured and executed in 1910. 
Later in the same year, the Anglo-Egyptian colonial authorities preferred his brother, 
Adam Jabouri, as his successor in order to calm the volatile situation in the area of 
Tagoi. The Tagoi then became subject to the Tegali Kingdom, which, with the support 
of the Anglo-Egyptian rule, became the dominant kingdom in the region, before it was 
converted into the so-called “East Jebels District” (Kenrick 1948: 144-148).
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Many Tagoi migrated out of the area, and the kingdom has therefore become 
a free area for settlement by Hawazma and their allies, 14 who have succeeded 
in developing an independent native administration in the area, and have 
begun to contest the Tagoi’s rights to political authority and land.
Many Tagoi are of the opinion that it was their former native administra-
tions after the reign of Mek Adam Jabouri that gave these newcomers tracts of 
land to temporarily settle on and cultivate, but they have recently claimed 
ownership of these lands. As I have mentioned before, the Tagoi claim that 
they were deported from Sinnar areas in the early 18th century and settled in 
the north-eastern Nuba Mountains. Later migrations brought groups from 
Barno, Bargo, and Fallata, who over time became minorities in the newly-es-
tablished Tagoi territory, working in rain-fed agriculture and in orchards. 
Another three groups of nomadic cattle herders (Baggara: the Hawazma and 
Ambararo) and camel herders (Abbala: the Shanabla) began passing through 
Tagoi territory as they moved between their autumn homes (makharif) in 
North Kordofan and summer homes (masayif) in South Kordofan or South 
Sudan (the Kaka area of the Upper Nile region).
Initially, there was peaceful coexistence and reciprocity between Tagoi 
and these late arrivals. Men from these groups would leave their wives and 
children with their Tagoi neighbours when they moved southwards with 
their animals. They even had “sowaybat” (stores) at the homes of Tagoi fami-
lies to store the crops they harvested from the cultivable land tracts that 
were often offered to them for use during their presence in the Tagoi Area 
and that they could not take with them to North Kordofan. In return, many 
Tagoi used to give the new arrivals their cows to look after with their own. 
Members of these late-arriving groups celebrated occasions of both 
14. The Hawazma who settled in the north-eastern Nuba Mountains have splintered 
into subgroups: (1) the Abu Al-Ali Hawazma, who in turn split into four internal kin-
groups: Dar Gwad, Awlad Qaboush, Dar Baytti and Naiili; (2) the Al-Halafa Hawazma, 
who are divided in turn into eight internal kin-groups: Dar Ali, Dar Fayid, Al-Assirrah, 
Awlad Quhaym, Awlad Tatbiddo, Salamat, Al-Ayadgah, and Al-Togiyah; and (3) the 
Rawawgah Hawazma, who split into three internal kin-groups: Dar Jama’a, Awlad 
Nuba and Dallahya. Each of these Hawazma subgroups has an administration led by 
an Omda. These administrations were formed with the introduction of the Nazirate 
system in the early 1950s, before Sudan gained independence from the Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium. The Hawazma then nominated a Nazir to rule over them 
(Al-Tahir Al-Nour Khawai). During these last years of Anglo-Egyptian rule, the 
Hawazma had no permanent settlement in the Tagoi Area. Later, they only had three 
settlements in the Alfaydh and Um Berimbeta areas, each of which was conined to a 
small kin-group from the Al-Halafa Hawazma, which was expelled from the Hawazma 
homeland for misconduct (committing murder or engaging in conlict over political 
authority): Salamat, Dar Fayid, and Al-Ayadgah.
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celebration and bereavement with their Tagoi neighbours, and enjoyed close 
friendships with them. Even in situations where their animals encroached on 
to Tagoi cultivations, the Hawazma consistently and voluntarily came to the 
affected farmers to pay adequate compensation for their losses. These inti-
mate relationships extended to the point where the native administration of 
Tagoi provided the Hawazma with places to stay overnight on dunes of red 
sandy or semi-laterized clay loam soil (“garadid”, singular “gardood”), 
which in most cases extended from the north to the south of the Tagoi terri-
tory. This gift led to disagreements between the native administration of 
Tagoi and the ordinary Tagoi people 15 that escalated to violence. As some 
Tagoi informants describe them, these garadid are areas where large trees 
abound, and there are plentiful large termite hills (ganattiir) where large ser-
pents live (such as the serpent called “ras al-shaytan” [head of the demon]). 
For the Tagoi, the north-south direction is inauspicious and associated with 
demons and their movement, and it is the direction of the garadid that is 
believed to make them a “natural” abode for demons. In any event, the gara-
did are the places where the Hawazma stay overnight, and many Tagoi 
identify them and their cattle as demons. The relationship between garadid, 
demons and the Hawazma not only tells us that the Tagoi informants are 
inclined to demonize the Hawazma, portraying them as wicked and threat-
ening, but also shows that the Tagoi leaders gave garadid to Hawazma 
because according to the Tagoi’s belief system they are uninhabitable and 
uncultivable areas of land: the Tagoi do not live or cultivate crops on the 
garadid because they are the places where demons reside. The subsequent 
conlict between the two groups was not about the garadid, however, but 
about fertile land and housing areas. Nevertheless, although they were 
unusable, inauspicious and associated with demons, the garadid could be 
15. The old political and administrative hierarchy of the Tagoi included representa-
tives from the different residential areas, who made up a “board of advisors” for the 
king. The king and his advisory council represented the political authority, and were 
involved in all large and small matters concerning the Tagoi tribe. Since the reign of 
the late king (Mek Mohamed Ahmed Hamdan), the label “king” has been replaced 
with “Amir” (prince), just as the label “advisors” has been replaced with “Omdas” 
and “Sheikhs”. Political and administrative ofices are hereditary through the male 
line, and hence exclusive to certain families. The ofice of king is inherited as follows: 
two girls who have never been married, and who are selected according to certain 
criteria, are seated beside the new king at his investiture, one on his right and the 
other on his left. One of these two girls must be from his mother’s side, and the other 
from his father’s (to satisfy the two parties). The new king must marry these two girls 
at that moment, even if he has been married before. The irst son the king fathers by 
one of these two wives becomes the Prince of the Crown, or the son who deserves to 
be the next king of the Tagoi.
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granted to the Hawazma as temporary overnight accommodation in accord-
ance with certain agreements and conditions. They are not allowed to form 
permanent settlements for them, however, simply because they form an inte-
gral part of the Tagoi’s inherited lands.
CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENT OF OUTSIDERS
For the Tagoi informants, the Hawazma had an ancient “mirhal” (plural 
“maraheel”), a term that means a speciic route for a nomadic pastoral group. 
Their mirhal still exists today: it starts from their home area of Al-Hammadi in 
the north and goes south, irst through the areas of Kadero and Kortala, and 
then across the areas of the “Six Mountains” to the west of the Tagoi Area’s 
western border, and through the areas to the west of Kawalib and Sheibun and 
the east of Kadugli (see Map no. 1, above). It then proceeds southwards to 
Bahr Al-Arab. Since the early 1970s, however, the Hawazma have started to 
use new maraheel that cross the Tagoi Area from north to south.
According to some informants, when the Tagoi were living on the Mount of 
Tagoi, the Hawazma were grazing their cattle in the surrounding lowlands. Just 
after the Tagoi descended on to these lowlands, the Hawazma and other 
smaller groups began to settle with them. The Tagoi native administration 
allowed these groups to settle with the Tagoi on the steppes, which they 
thought of as Tagoi property for many years. At the time, there were other mara-
heel that were used by other small nomadic pastoral groups, who crossed the 
Tagoi Area as they moved between their masayif on the rich savannahs of South 
Kordofan and South Sudan and their makharif on the poor savannahs of North 
Kordofan in search of water and pastures. Over time, many families from the 
host and transient groups, which were rapidly growing in size, began to take 
possession of tracts of land with a view to settling in the region permanently.
The reign of Mek Adam Jabouri saw the beginnings of the organization of 
the maraheel for the nomadic pastoral groups that had been accustomed to 
crossing the Tagoi Area. These maraheel had entrances, exits, places to stay 
overnight and tracks for movement, which the Tagoi native administration used 
to identify at its annual meetings, and which were basically intended to pre-
vent animals encroaching on to the Tagoi’s cultivations and other properties. 
Um Berimbeta was the irst area the Hawazma passed through on their jour-
ney from the Allouba area (Al-Rahad) in North Kordofan southwards to the 
Liyya Um Sharmout area in the southern part of the Nuba Mountains or the 
Kaka area (Upper Nile) in South Sudan. 16 When they arrived at Um Berimbeta, 
the Hawazma would send a delegate to the king of Tagoi to inform him of their 
16. Hawazma families that only had a few cows tended to stop in the Liyya Um 
Sharmout area, while families with many cows usually continued on to Kaka.
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arrival in the region and their numbers and to pay the transit fees. It was only 
after this had been done that the Tagoi king would give them permission to dig 
wells for drinking water and use the pastures along the marked maraheel. At 
the beginning of the rainy season in North Kordofan in June, the Hawazma 
returned to their makharif in North Kordofān along the same marked maraheel. 
There were three maraheel for the Hawazma in Tagoi territory, which still 
remain open today. The irst passes through non-agricultural areas, starting in 
Um Berimbeta and crossing the areas of Tandawah, Toamah and Tajmalah. The 
second starts in Um Berimbeta and passes to the east of the Tarawah agricul-
tural areas and to the west of the Rashad agricultural areas (that is, the Malgat 
and Sharak agricultural schemes). The third starts in Um Berimbeta and crosses 
Al-Awaja and Al-Rihaynah, and then Hajar Yasin near Ambayr, from where it 
goes along the sharie alhawa (highway) directly to Talodi.
The descent from the Mount of Tagoi on to the plains did not create clear 
conlicts with the tribal groups in the region at that time. In the beginning, the 
conlict between the Tagoi and Hawazma took the form of simple underlying 
disputes between farmers and shepherds about natural resources, and it was 
manageable by the use of the available conlict mitigation mechanisms. 
When, for example, a conlict emerged as a result of an encroachment of 
nomads’ animals on to the Tagoi farmers’ cultivations outside the marked 
maraheel, it was resolved by a committee of “ajawiid” (mediators) made up of 
representatives of the tribal groups in the particular area and chosen by the 
advisor concerned, a Sheikh or an Omda. If the native administrators failed to 
resolve a conlict, they would hand it over to the police, to be handled 
through the justice system by applying Sudanese criminal law.
 REPEATED EVACUATION AND LAND GRABS
There have been several waves of forced mass migrations from the Tagoi 
Area over more than a hundred years. Some have been due to authority issues 
and feelings of injustice, oppression and exclusion, while others have been 
associated with national resistance uprisings. 17 These six migrations took the 
following forms: (1) the group that accompanied Mek Jabouri Jeelyh II (1888-
96) on his military campaign against Abyssinia during the Mahdist revolution; 
(2) the group of soldiers Mek Gedayl Jabouri (1897-1910) sent to support 
Sultan Ali Dinar in his ight against the Anglo-Egyptian army in Darfur; (3) the 
17. There were other voluntary migrations from the Tagoi Area (labour, educational, 
rural-urban, etc.). These were migrations of individuals with no signiicant impact on 
the local demographic structure, which is why they have been excluded from the list. 
Besides, there was no mass migration from the Tagoi Area during the First Sudanese 
Civil War, simply because the area was not part of the war zone.
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families and other close relatives of the assassinated Mek Idris Karbos Jeelyh 
(1896-7) and his brother Ismail, who migrated to Abbasiyya; (4) the groups 
that led from the Mount of Tagoi after heavy artillery shelling in 1910 by 
Anglo-Egyptian forces during the reign of Mek Gedayl Jabouri; (5) the group 
of horse-riding Tagoi ighters the Anglo-Egyptian government deported to 
Darfur after the killing of Mek Gedayl Jabouri; and (6) the groups that have 
recently been displaced from the area because of the ongoing civil war in 
South Kordofan between government forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement-North (SPLM/A-N). Over the course of time, all these events and 
mass exoduses have led to a sharp decline in the number of Tagoi and to 
many areas being depopulated.
A hundred years after the signiicant population loss in their tribe as a 
result of violence between the forces of Mek Gedayl Jabouri and the Anglo-
Egyptian government, the Tagoi have also found themselves involved in the 
current civil war, which began in 2011 and has produced an acute crisis and 
the displacement of large numbers of Tagoi families.
Since the late 1970s, many pockets of Hawazma, Bargo, Barno, Fallata, 
Masalit, and Jallaba merchants have settled permanently in the various Tagoi 
areas and have become involved in disputes with them over natural resources 
and political authority. The reason behind these settlements is that when the 
land included in the mechanized agricultural schemes that had been con-
structed in the areas of Um Lubia and Rideena within the Tagoi Area by the 
Nimeiri government in 1978, which included a total area of more than 50,000 
acres, was distributed, 18 these groups took the lion’s share, as they had the 
funds to purchase it. Owing to a lack of money, and despite the complaints 
iled by the Tagoi native administration with the authorities concerned, most 
Tagoi were not successful in buying land within the mechanized agricultural 
schemes. 19 The establishment of mechanized agricultural schemes in the 
Tagoi Area did not affect the nomadic pastoral activities of the Hawazma and 
others, however, because the areas where these schemes were established 
had previously been marshland and therefore were no good for cattle herd-
ing, and the nomadic pastoral groups’ maraheel also passed through the 
mountains, away from these marshlands. Establishment of these schemes 
involved a considerable portion of the Tagoi agricultural lands that have been 
completely abandoned by them with the passage of time. Other parts of the 
Tagoi agricultural lands were taken away to become maraheel for the nomadic 
pastoralists. Because of this, claims of ownership of these lands by these 
18. Um Lubia is in the southern part of the Tagoi Area, between Alfaydh and the bor-
der with Liri and Tira. Rideena is in the western part of the Tagoi Area, between the 
Mount of Tagoi and the border with Kawalib.
19. Source: Mek Mohamed Ahmed, the former king of Tagoi, in a group interview, 
Khartoum, 24/11/2012.
129
CONFLICT WITH OTHERS AT A BLEEDING FRONTIER
groups have begun to surface. This is in addition to the Tagoi land that had 
previously been cut for cotton production and cotton gins, and other land that 
was taken from the Tagoi Area and annexed to neighbouring areas. For exam-
ple, Um Berimbeta, Um Lubia, Waykaya, and other areas of fertile agricultural 
lands were attached to the native administration of the Hawazma (the Emarat 
Al-Halafa). The Hawazma also took Abu Kershola, to which the areas of khor 
Dileeb and Ambayr were later afiliated administratively. These were the fer-
tile western and southern areas of Tagoi territory, and had formerly been used 
for cotton production. As a result of all of this, the social map of the Tagoi 
Area has been changed with regard to its borders.
As the Tagoi informants told me, the period in Sudan the recently arrived 
migrants into the Tagoi Area exploited most was the Nimeiri Regime (1969-
1985). 20 They did so by taking control of all the administrative structures at a 
provincial level by becoming involved in the Sudanese Socialist Union, which 
was the country’s only legal political party between 1971 and 1985. By so 
doing, the members of these groups took possession of political authority and 
were thus instrumental in setting up the mechanized agricultural schemes in the 
areas of Um Lubia and Rideena and distributing their lands on terms that took 
the inancial capabilities of the members of their groups into consideration.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Since the beginning of the Second Sudanese Civil War between the cen-
tral GoS and the SPLA/M, security concerns have prevented the Hawazma 
and Ambararo from reaching their traditional masayif in the South Sudan 
side of the border. These security concerns previously arose because of the 
war, but since the secession of South Sudan in 2011 they have shifted to the 
international border between Sudan and South Sudan. Nonetheless, the 
Ambararo easily managed to move their masayif to the Liri area in South 
Kordofan, although they still pass through Tagoi territory without settling in 
the Liri or Tagoi areas permanently. The Shanabla had no tradition of travel-
ling to any area beyond the present border with South Sudan, because the 
inal destination of their southbound movement is the Kabus area of Rashad 
Locality in South Kordofan. The Ambararo and Shanabla therefore had no 
problem with adapting to the latest developments; this problem was con-
ined to the Hawazma, who had to look for a solution. Some settled in Tagoi 
territory in the form of dense concentrations (hallal, neighbourhoods) in 
three areas (Alfaydh, Um Berimbeta and Abu Kershola), where they began to 
purchase Tagoi land.
20. These recently arrived migrants include groups of Hawazma, Bargo, Barno, and 
Fallata.
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According to the Tagoi informants, the Tagoi have recently felt that the 
Hawazma’s strategy for adapting to the recent security and political develop-
ments involves a plan to grab land and settle in Tagoi territory, emptying it of 
its traditional owners through militarization and joining the militias supported 
by the GoS in its war against the SPLM/A-N rebels in South Kordofan. Based 
on this feeling, many young Tagoi males 21 have joined the SPLM/A-N to be 
armed and to receive military training that might help them protect their 
land. 22 Consequently, there has been an escalating conlict over land and 
political authority between the two tribal groups under the umbrella of the 
armed conlict between the GoS and the SPLM/A-N.
In order to increase their strength against the Tagoi, the Hawazma joined 
the Barno, Bargo and Fallata in an alliance under the name “Al-Halafa” based 
on a common interest in land acquisition. Historically speaking, during the 
reign of Mek Adam Jabouri (1910-33) a “Mandobia” (representative ofice) 
with limited authority was granted to the chief of the Hawazma to permit him 
to rule his group on behalf of the Tagoi king. Under the current National 
Salvation Government (speciically in 1995), the Hawazma Mandobia has 
been upgraded to an independent principality known as the “Emarat 
Al-Halafa”, 23 with a shift of most of the group’s members from the former Ansar 
Al-Mahdi and Umma Party to current support of the ruling National Congress 
Party (NCP), and heavy involvement in the government-supported militias. 24
For many Tagoi informants, the current key difference between the Emarat 
Tagoi and the Emarat Al-Halafa is that the former governs settled people who 
enjoy the right to both own and use land, whereas the latter governs nomads, 
21. Most of these young rebels joined the SPLM/A-N in response to the Hawazma’s 
attack on the Tagoi areas in April 2011. They came from a variety of social strata.
22. These Tagoi rebels engage in military activities that are designed to halt Hawazma 
expansion over Tagoi land. These activities manifest themselves in the form of engag-
ing in armed skirmishes with Hawazma cattle herders, killing large numbers among 
them, and abducting their livestock. They also take the form of targeting Hawazma 
residential areas. Their aim is to weaken the potential of the Hawazma and destabi-
lize their settlements.
23. The headquarters of the Emarat Al-Halafa is Um Berimbeta.
24. This political and administrative development coincided with the change in the 
old political and administrative hierarchy of the Tagoi through the replacement of the 
king-advisers structure with the Amir-Omdas-Sheikhs structure that is known and 
used in many Sudanese communities. The change was part of an overhaul imposed by 
the government of South Kordofan State in 1995, when every king in the region was 
renamed “Amir”, and their advisors were given the labels “Omdas” and “Sheikhs” in 
accordance with their particular administrative levels. One purpose of the change was 
to create some sort of equality between the various existing kingdoms and emirates in 
the region in terms of the rights to land and socio-political signiicance and weight.
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who only have the right to use the land along the maraheel for cultivation and 
grazing. The disagreement regarding the nature of the two types of native 
administration was what lay behind the escalation of the conlict between the 
Tagoi and the Hawazma and their allies (Al-Halafa). The Tagoi informants 
believe that granting Al-Halafa an independent administration parallel to the 
Tagoi’s means that these newcomers share ownership of land with them, an 
attempt that they depict as looking for a bloody conlict on the ground.
There had been a series of conlicts between Tagoi and Hawazma in previ-
ous times, 25 but these were resolved by the use of a successful mechanism: 
the king of Tagoi and the Omda of Hawazma routinely met in a place between 
their residential areas (mostly at the Mangala rest-house in the Toamah area). 
The litigants had to appear before them and relate their problems from their 
own respective points of view. Since the conlict between Tagoi and Hawazma 
has been associated with the renewed civil war in South Kordofan, however, 
the native administration no longer has adequate authority or powers to inter-
vene in and resolve local disputes.
All of this is in addition to the premeditated intention to drive the Tagoi 
from the area. The current National Salvation Government has used the fact 
that one of the leaders of the SPLM/A-N (Abdel Aziz Al-Hilo) is a Tagoi and 
that many young Tagoi men have recently joined the SPLM/A-N against the 
Tagoi, and the situation has encouraged the government to support the 
Hawazma and their allies politically and militarily in their conlict against 
Tagoi over the ownership and use of natural resources. The Tagoi informants 
believe that this support is extensive, and that one of its consequences has 
been the mingling of Arabism with the popular defence force that supports the 
oficial army of the government against the rebel movement, which has also 
mingled with non-Arabism. Political mobilization in the Tagoi Area to partici-
pate in the war has therefore been along “government versus opposition” lines. 
The Tagoi have split into two segments: a smaller one that supports the govern-
ment, and a larger one that supports and/or joins the SPLM/A-N. The former 
group is said to come mostly from the lower, and politically weak, social strata 
in the various local communities of Tagoi, while the latter is mostly from the 
25. The irst war between the two sides was in the 1940s, when the Tagoi expelled the 
Hawazma from the Tagoi Area by force.
132
OSMAN MOHAMED OSMAN ALI
upper, and politically strong, social strata. 26 The Hawazma have chosen to 
support the government in order to bring their plan to seize land and political 
authority in the region, which all the Tagoi informants view as being histori-
cally properties belonging to them, to fruition. The Hawazma have also had 
the opportunity to acquire suficient strength to achieve this. The government 
has had to balance its support for the Tagoi, who support it to a limited degree, 
but clearly support the armed opposition, and its support for the Hawazma, 
who support it completely. The Tagoi have therefore been deprived of govern-
ment support, and they also feel that the government “stands in line” with the 
Hawazma and their allies. As a result, and with the escalation of conlict into 
more excessive violence, more Tagoi have joined the armed opposition in the 
Nuba Mountains, and others have been displaced to other parts of Sudan. The 
Tagoi Area has become a land of war, armed robbery, and other forms of mass 
violence that have generated a feeling of insecurity among all the residents of 
the area (the Tagoi, Hawazma, and others) and hence have forced many to 
move away to safer areas. It has been observed that during the escalation of 
the conlict, the Hawazma frequently failed to stick to the deined maraheel, as 
the cases of the intentional encroachment of herdsmen’s animals on to Tagoi 
farms has increased considerably, stirring a great deal of violent friction.
Some Tagoi informants are of the opinion that the conlict between the 
Tagoi and the Hawazma over land and political authority has recently become 
entangled with the political conlict between the GoS and the SPLM/A-N: 
these informants describe the conlict between the Tagoi and Hawazma as 
both “tribal” and “political”, as between the Tagoi and the Hawazma and their 
26. One legend recounted by the Tagoi informants tells that in ancient times, a man 
and his wife gave birth to pairs of leopards, serpents, lions, bees, humans, and small 
red locusts. All these pairs lived as one family. Over time, the pairs of leopards, ser-
pents, lions, bees, and locusts were expelled into the wilderness for misconduct, while 
the human pair remained with the parents. The pairs in the wilderness developed into 
spiritual beings that the Tagoi distinguish from similar natural beings. It is believed that 
there are spiritual and blood bonds between these spiritual beings and various Tagoi 
families, as they are all come from one couple. Members of the families associated 
with these spiritual beings could see them or use them for their own beneit. The impor-
tance of each animal or insect illustrates the social statuses of the Tagoi kin-groups. At 
the top in terms of importance is the leopard, for its strength, courage and ierceness, 
as it is the “king of animals”. The kin-group linked to the leopard (royal families) enjoys 
political authority and the highest social status. Next come the serpent and the lion, 
which are seen as deputies of the leopard, because they are also strong, brave, and 
ierce, but to a lesser degree than the leopard. Next are the bees, which provide people 
with food and symbolize goodness, while also being dangerous. In last position come 
the locusts, which are harmful. Importantly, persons inherit their fathers’ social status, 
whether it be the kin-group of the leopard, serpent, locusts or other spiritual beings.
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allies, including the central government. With the intervention of the govern-
ment and opposition groups, the local conlict between the Hawazma and 
Tagoi has reached a new dimension. The government wanted more supporters 
who could carry arms and ight on its behalf against the rebel SPLM/A-N in 
the Nuba Mountains in general, and the Hawazma and their allies have taken 
advantage of this need, enrolled in the government-backed militias, and thus 
obtained arms and advanced military training that has beneited them in their 
conlict with the Tagoi, which was formerly of a limited scope, because it was 
associated with the use of elderly light weapons between limited numbers of 
people. The recent possession of modern irearms has extended the conlict to 
include highly-trained armed forces and armaments.
In June 2011, after the secession of South Sudan, the civil war broke out 
again between the GoS troops and the SPLM/A-N in many areas of South 
Kordofan, including the Tagoi Area. The renewed war has forcibly displaced 
the majority of Tagoi families to safer areas in Sudan, particularly in Khartoum, 
Kosti, Al-Rahad, El-Obeid, Wad Medani, and Sinnar. As I mentioned above, 
the result of this mass displacement has been that most Tagoi areas are now 
unpopulated. Only the families of the royal kin-group (the iyal Jabouri) are in 
Alfaydh at present, as the king and his family are prevented by Tagoi custom-
ary law from travelling and settling permanently outside the borders of the 
kingdom under any circumstances.
Some of the Tagoi informants described the latest escalation of conlict 
between Tagoi and Al-Halafa. As they tell it, this escalation started with the 
assassination of Omda Abdul Karim, the Omda of Abu Al-Hassan village, in 
Alfaydh by a group of armed Hawazma, who attacked him as he was leaving his 
home to conduct the night-time prayer (ṣalat al- isha ) at the mosque. Omda 
Abdul Karim was one of the harshest critics of the presence of Al-Halafa in the 
Tagoi Area and was outspoken in declaring the need to force them to leave the 
area. After his assassination, a powerful movement to expel the Al-Halafa from 
the area grew among the Tagoi. Meanwhile, the Al-Halafa called a meeting, at 
which large numbers of their young men assembled and were armed, and a 
plan was prepared to attack the Tagoi in their various areas during the Eid prayer 
and wipe them out. As an incentive for the young combatants, land and orchards 
owned by Tagoi people were distributed to them in advance as proceeds of war. 
The plan was to make the entire Tagoi Area the property of the Al-Halafa. The 
attack began in Alfaydh and moved to a number of other Tagoi villages – 
Ambayr, Toamah, Abu Al-Hassan, Al-Mansur, Jibaylat, and Tarawah – which 
were completely run down and abandoned and occupied by Sudanese army 
forces during the period of ieldwork on which this article is based. The attack, 
which was carried out by troops from the popular defence forces composed 
exclusively of Al-Halafa and backed by the government army, was accompanied 
by the killing of residents and the burning of houses. The young Tagoi from the 
SPLM/A-N intervened militarily to defend their people, taking the Mount of 
Tagoi as their base, and with this military intervention, the attack was halted.
134
OSMAN MOHAMED OSMAN ALI
CONCLUDING REMARK
The social order the Tagoi have built over more than two centuries has 
weakened due to factors including armed conlicts or security threats, land 
grabs for agricultural investment, government-inluenced native administra-
tion, migrations, and contacts with other communities. Their old independent 
kingdom no longer governs them; instead they are currently living in a mod-
ern State in which they cannot organize themselves as their grandparents did. 
National and local developments have affected their possession of both polit-
ical authority and land, with its natural resources, as they have lost both with 
the passage of time. The former land ownership, the customarily agreed tribal 
boundaries, and control over the passage of nomadic pastoralists are no 
longer recognized under the modern State, whose conditions have created 
most of the changes we have studied in the lives of the Tagoi.
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